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Possible worlds and primitive modality
Abstract
This paper sets out a number of reasons for thinking that the framework of possible worlds, even when
construed non-reductively, does not provide an adequate basis for an explanation of modality. I first
consider a non-reductive version of Lewis' modal realism, and then move on to consider the ersatzist
approach of Plantinga et al. My main complaint is that the framework of possible worlds gets the
semantics and metaphysics of ordinary modal discourse wrong. That is, possible worlds do not give us
an adequate answer to the semantic question of what ordinary modal claims mean, nor do they give us
an adequate answer to the metaphysical question of what makes such claims true
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Abstract
This paper sets out a number of reasons for thinking that the framework of possible
worlds, even when construed non-reductively, does not provide an adequate basis for
an explanation of modality. I ﬁrst consider a non-reductive version of Lewis’ modal
realism, and then move on to consider the ersatzist approach of Plantinga et al. My
main complaint is that the framework of possibleworlds gets the semantics andmeta-
physics of ordinarymodal discoursewrong. That is, possibleworlds do not give us an
adequate answer to the semantic question of what ordinary modal claims mean, nor
do they give us an adequate answer to the metaphysical question of what makes such
claims true.
There is a growing consensus among philosophers that modality
cannot be reductively explained. Modal notions are to be accounted
for, not by trying to reduce them to non-modal ones, but rather by
tracing their complex interconnections with one another. The most
prominent non-reductive approach to modality is what David
Lewis calls ersatzism.1 Like Lewis, ersatzists attempt to explain
modality in terms of possible worlds and their inhabitants. Unlike
Lewis, they construe possible worlds as abstract representations of
concrete worlds, rather than as concrete worlds themselves. And
unlike Lewis, of course, they construe possible worlds as primitively
modal in nature. Proponents of ersatzism include Adams, Kripke,
Plantinga, and Stalnaker among others.2
1 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986),
Ch. 3. Ersatzism also goes by the name of ‘ersatz modal realism’, ‘actualism
about possible worlds’, ‘abstractionism’, and ‘moderate modal realism’.
2 See: Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1974), Ch. 4, and ‘Actualism and Possible Worlds’, reprinted in
Michael Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1979), 253–73; Robert Stalnaker, ‘Possible Worlds’, rep-
rinted in Loux, op. cit., 225–34, and Inquiry (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1984), 43–58; Robert Adams, ‘Theories of Actuality’, reprinted in
Loux, op. cit., 190–209; Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1980), 15–20, 43–53.
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In this paper, I will set out a number of reasons for thinking that
the framework of possible worlds, even when construed non-
reductively as the ersatzist does, does not provide an adequate basis
for an explanation of modality. I will ﬁrst consider a non-reductive
version of Lewis’ modal realism, and then move on to consider the
ersatzist approach of Adams et al. My main complaint against using
the framework of possible-worlds to account for modality is that
doing so gets the semantics and metaphysics of ordinary modal dis-
course wrong. That is, possible worlds do not give us an adequate
answer to the semantic question of what ordinary modal claims
mean, nor do they give us an adequate answer to the metaphysical
question of what makes such claims true. Both complaints will
ultimately be underwritten by a version of the charge from irrele-
vance that Kripke and Plantinga originally levelled against Lewis’
counterpart-theoretic account of de re modality.
1. Ordinary Modal Discourse vs. Possible-Worlds Discourse
Before setting out these challenges to the use of the framework of
possible worlds, I need to say a little more about the notion of ‘ordin-
ary modal discourse’ I am employing here. By ordinary modal dis-
course I understand a body of claims that are expressed by means
of modal adverbs such as ‘possibly’, ‘necessarily’, and ‘actually’, as
well as by modal verbs such as ‘can’, ‘might’, ‘must’, ‘would’, etc.
These modal idioms are so-called because they qualify the way or
mode in which a proposition is true or false, or the way or mode in
which an object has a property or stands to another object.
Examples of ordinary modal claims include: ‘Possibly, there are uni-
corns’, ‘Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried’, ‘Humphrey might
have won the 1968 US presidential election’, ‘Socrates is necessarily
human’, ‘The world could have been a better place’, and so on.
Ordinary modal discourse is ordinary in the sense that it employs
the modal idioms that people use in everyday, non-specialised con-
texts to express modal claims. But, as some of the claims above illus-
trate, ordinary modal discourse includes claims that are typically
made only in a philosophical context, and so claims that are in
another sense anything but ordinary.
In contrast to ordinary modal discourse, there is the possible-
worlds discourse. Possible-worlds discourse is a body of claims which
involve quantiﬁcation over possible worlds and possible individuals.
Examples of possible-worlds claims include counterparts of our
examples of ordinary modal claims above; thus, ‘In some possible
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world there areunicorns’, ‘There is apossibleworld inwhichHumphrey
(or a counterpart of Humphrey) wins the 1968 US presidential elec-
tion’, and so on. Unlike ordinary modal discourse, possible-worlds
discourse is largely the preserve of philosophers (and other specialists).
Ordinary people do not typically express their modal commitments by
quantifying over possibilia.3
In this paper, I will be concerned with the question of whether the
framework of possible worlds provides the right semantics and meta-
physics for ordinary modal discourse. Save for a remark towards the
end of the paper, I will not address the question of whether possible-
worlds discourse should be taken at face value, i.e., as quantifying
over possibilia, or whether possible-worlds claims should be under-
stood in terms of their renderings in the language of ordinary
modal discourse. It is indeed a philosophically controversial question
whether every claim involving quantiﬁcation over possibilia is trans-
latable into a claim that only employs ordinary modal idioms.4
2. Non-Reductive Modal Realism?
There are compelling reasons for thinking that Lewis’ modal realist
account of modality fails in its reductive aspirations.5 The question
remains nevertheless whether a non-reductive version of modal
3 Possible-world discourse can mix quantiﬁcation over possible worlds
and possible individuals with the modal idioms drawn from ordinary modal
discourse – e.g., ‘There could have been more worlds than there are’. What
is important for us, however, is only that possible-world discourse involves,
while ordinary discourse does not involve, quantiﬁcation over possibilia.
4 Modalists claim that this can be done. See: Graeme Forbes, The
Metaphysics of Modality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) and Languages of
Possibility (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) for a defence; and Joseph Melia,
‘Against Modalism’, Philosophical Studies, 68 (1992), 35–56, and Modality
(UK: Acumen, 2003), Ch. 4 for dissent.
5 See: Javier Kalhat, ‘Has Lewis ReducedModality?’,European Journal
of Philosophy (forthcoming); William Lycan, ‘The Trouble with Possible
Worlds’, reprinted in Loux (ed.), op. cit. note 2, 274–316, ‘Review of On
the Plurality of Worlds’, Journal of Philosophy, 85 (1988), 42–7, ‘Two–
No, Three–Concepts of Possible Worlds’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, 91 (1991), 215–27, and ‘Pot Bites Kettle: A Reply to Miller’,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 69 (1991), 212–13; Scott Shalkowski,
‘The Ontological Ground of the Alethic Modality’, Philosophical Review,
103 (1994), 669–88; Colin McGinn, Logical Properties (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2000), Ch. 4.
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realism might constitute an adequate account of modality. Like
reductive modal realism, non-reductive modal realism asserts that
there is a plurality of concrete worlds and their inhabitants. Unlike
reductive modal realism, non-reductive modal realism takes some
of those worlds to have the primitive attribute of being possible and
others to have the primitive attribute of being impossible (mutatis
mutandis for their inhabitants). This means, of course, that the non-
reductive modal realist cannot construe necessity and possibility
simply as Lewis does, namely as quantiﬁers ranging over a domain
of worlds and counterparts.6 Nevertheless, non-reductive modal
realism can offer analyses of modal notions in terms of the same
biconditionals that Lewis gives. These biconditionals provide
de dicto modal claims with truth-conditions that specify what is
true in some or all possible worlds, and they provide de re modal
claims with truth-conditions that specify what is true of some or all
counterparts of a given individual. Thus:
ðPDÞ Possibly P iff for some possible world w; P is true at w
ðNDÞ Necessarily P iff for every possible world w; P is true at w
ðPRÞ x is possibly F iff for some possible world w; y is a
counterpart of x in w; and y is F
ðNRÞ x is necessarily F iff for every possible world w; if y is a
counterpart of x in w; then y is F
Is non-reductive modal realism a plausible account of primitive
modality? I do not think so. While non-reductive modal realism
avoids some of the problems confronting Lewis’ reductive modal
realism – chieﬂy those concerning the issue of reduction – non-
reductive modal realism still confronts other problems that
plague Lewis. I will set out three of those problems, mostly with
reference to Lewis’ own reductive brand of modal realism, though
it will be clear that they apply equally well to non-reductive modal
realism.
The ﬁrst problem concerns the distinctive claim of modal realism,
namely, that there is an inﬁnite plurality of concrete worlds. No
amount of philosophy, it seems to me, should convince us that there
are such entities. Lewis’ theory, fascinating and rigorous as it is, illus-
trates the pitfalls of following the argument wherever it leads, regard-
less of how implausible one’s position becomes as a result of doing so.
6 Lewis, op. cit. note 1, 5ff.
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Lewis exploits a style of philosophical argument introduced byQuine
called a utility argument.7 Utility arguments postulate entities of a
given kind (sets, possible worlds, etc.) on the grounds that doings
so affords us adequate and systematic explanations of a range of phi-
losophically central concepts – the implication being that the ade-
quacy of the explanations is evidence, albeit indirect, for the
existence of the entities. Perhaps this is the best that can be done in
philosophy; but let us not be oblivious to the dangers of practicing
philosophy in this way. As used by Lewis, one such argument is sup-
posed to give us good reason to believe in an inﬁnite plurality of
worlds, each of which is just as real and concrete as the actual world
we live in. But no amount of philosophical thinking (even if brilliant
as Lewis’ is) should convince us of that.
Lewis distinguishes two kinds of economy: qualitative and quanti-
tative.8 A theory is qualitatively economical if it keeps down the
number of kinds of entities it postulates; so a theory that postulates
bodies alone is more economical in this sense than a theory that pos-
tulates bodies and souls. A theory is quantitatively economical, on the
other hand, if it keeps down the number of instances of the kinds it
postulates; so a theory that postulates n electrons is more economical
in this sense than a theory that postulates nþ1 electrons. Lewis recog-
nises ‘no presumption whatever’ in favour of quantitative economy;
only in favour of qualitative economy.9 And he claims that modal
realism is qualitatively economical, for we already believe in the
actual world, and he is only asking us to believe in more things of
that kind. But this is disingenuous. For while Lewis is asking us to
believe in the existence of more worlds, some of those worlds are
populated by dragons, witches, unicorns, three-headed monsters,
gods, indeed souls, and every other consistent creature of our imagin-
ation – and at least some of these are additional kinds of entities to the
ones we are already prepared to countenance. Modal realism is thus
not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively uneconomical.
Metaphysics is a genuine discipline, one that can contribute in our
efforts to uncover the true nature of reality. But metaphysics cannot
be in competition with science; in particular, the metaphysician
cannot tell the scientist (or the explorer, for that matter) what there is.
At least, he cannot do so when it comes to entities which are suppo-
sedly no different in kind from the entities that the scientist studies –
‘empirical entities’, we might call them. The metaphysician might
7 Cf. Lewis, op. cit. note 1, 3–5
8 David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), 87.
9 Ibid.
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uncover, for example, that there are substances, or that objects have
essences. But neither substances nor essences are empirical entities:
scientists are not in the business of discovering substances10, or of
characterising the essences of objects (neither ‘substance’ nor
‘essence’ is a scientiﬁc term.). Accordingly, when the metaphysician
claims that there are substances or essences, he is not adding items to
the scientist’s inventory of what there is – substances and essences are
not additional entities to, say, electrons, the Ebola virus, the planet
Mars or the Milky Way. Lewis, on the other hand, is adding to the
scientists’ inventory of what there is, for his worlds are entities in
approximately the sense in which Mars or the Milky Way are
entities.11 Yet this is implausible. Metaphysics is an a priori, concep-
tual discipline, and as such it is simply methodologically barred from
pronouncing on what empirical entities there are.12 (The fact that
Lewis’ worlds are spatiotemporally and causally isolated from us
does not help; if anything, it adds to the puzzle of how we could
ever be in a position to know of their existence – cf. the ‘Benacerraf
problem’.13) The ﬁrst difﬁculty for non-reductive modal realism,
then, is that just like its reductive cousin, it implausibly demands
commitment to an inﬁnite plurality of concrete worlds.14
A second reason why non-reductive modal realism cannot provide
an adequate account of modality is that – again, like its reductive
cousin – it arguably gets the order of explanation the wrong way
around. Lewis’ analyses of modal notions in terms of possible
worlds and counterparts provide an answer to the metaphysical ques-
tion concerning the source or ontological ground of modal discourse.
The analyses specify truth-conditions for ordinary modal claims, and
those truth-conditions in turn specify portions of reality – namely,
10 In the metaphysical rather than in the chemical sense, of course.
11 Cf. Lewis, op. cit. note 1, 2.
12 InQuinean fashion, of course, themetaphysicianmight be able to tell
the scientist what he – the scientist – takes there to be.
13 See also Lewis’ discussion of this matter, op. cit. note 1, 108–15.
Tellingly, Quine defended the existence of sets on the grounds that they are
central to mathematics, and mathematics is central to science (to physics,
in particular) rather than to philosophy. For more discussion on the meth-
odological issues touched on here, see e.g., John Divers, Possible Worlds
(London: Routledge, 2002), Ch. 9, and Daniel Nolan, David Lewis
(UK: Acumen), 203–13.
14 I have ignored here the fact that non-reductivemodal realism discerns
impossible as well as possible concreteworlds among that plurality. This is, of
course, an additional problem for non-reductive modal realism (though not
for Lewis).
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possible worlds and their inhabitants – in virtue of which ordinary
modal claims are true. Stalnaker nicely puts the point as follows:
The possibilist [i.e., Lewis] has a clear and simple answer to the
central metaphysical question about modality: what is the source
of modal truth? The merely possible worlds that make prop-
ositions necessary or possible have the same status as the actual
world whose existence and character explains the truth of ordin-
ary contingent propositions. It is true that some tigers have teeth
because of the existence, in the universe in which we ﬁnd our-
selves, of tigers with teeth. According to the possibilist, it is poss-
ible that some tigers wear trousers for a similar reason: because of
the existence in a part of reality (though perhaps not the part we
ﬁnd ourselves in) of tigers that wear trousers. Modal truths are
made true by the same kind of correspondence with reality that
makes empirical claims true; the difference is that contingent
truths must be made true by local circumstances, while claims
about what is necessary or possible concern reality as a whole.15
According to Lewis, then, ordinary modal truths concerning the
actual world and its inhabitants are true in virtue of facts concerning
other possible worlds and their inhabitants. Put differently, ordinary
modal facts about the actual world and its inhabitants are, for Lewis,
constituted by facts about possible worlds and their inhabitants. The
same is true for the non-reductive modal realist; the only difference is
that he takes the relevant facts about possible worlds and their inhabi-
tants to be themselves primitively modal. The fact that (e.g.) Socrates
is necessarily human is constituted, then, by the (modal) fact that
every counterpart of Socrates is human. But this is to put the cart
before the horse.16 Socrates is not necessarily human in virtue of the
fact that every counterpart of him is human; the fact that every
counterpart of him is human is rather a consequence of the fact that
he is necessarily human. If Socrates is necessarily human, then
Socrates cannot exist without being human. A counterpart of
Socrates in another world is an individual that Socrates would have
been had that world been the actual world.17 Thus, every counterpart
15 Robert Stalnaker, ‘Modalities and PossibleWorlds’, in JaegwonKim
and Ernest Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Metaphysics (Oxford: Blackwell,
1995), 336–7.
16 David Oderberg,Real Essentialism (London: Routledge, 2007), 2–4.
17 David Lewis, ‘Counterpart Theory and Quantiﬁed Modal Logic’,
reprinted in his Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1983), 28.
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of Socrates is human because unless they were, none of them would
have been Socrates in the counterfactual situation in which their
world is actual. To reverse the order of explanation here is to make
Socrates’ essential humanity dependent on the circumstances in
which those counterparts ﬁnd themselves in – in particular, their
ﬁnding themselves to be human in the world in which they exist.
And this implausibly makes the fact that every counterpart of
Socrates is human nothing short of a metaphysical accident.
The explanatory inadequacy of reductive and non-reductive modal
realism can also be brought out by appealing to Fine’s recent and pro-
vocative suggestion that Lewis was in fact as sceptical about modality
as Quinewas, for neither could ‘understandmodality except as a form
of regularity’.18 Like Quine, Lewis is an empiricist, and empiricists
are generally suspicious of modal notions. They regard the world
as what is the case, and allow no room for what could be the case,
which falls short of what is the case, and for what must be the case,
which goes beyond what is the case. Fine points out that
[f]or empiricists, in so far as they have been able to make sense of
modality, have tended to see it as a form of regularity; for some-
thing to hold of necessity is for it always to hold, and for some-
thing to hold possibly is for it sometimes to hold. But if there
is not enough going on in the actual world to sustain the possibi-
lities that we take there to be, then one strategy for the empiricist
is to extend the arena upon which the possibilities are realized to
include what goes on in each possible world.19
This is, of course, the strategy Lewis pursues. Fine’s insight serves to
highlight just how inadequate Lewis’ account of modality really is.
For modality has got nothing to do with regularity. To say that a prop-
osition is necessarily true just in case it is true everywhere in logical
space is essentially no more plausible than to say that it is true just
in case it is true everywhere within the actual world. For it is not as
if enough non-modal truths could add up to a modal one. Necessity
is not the same as universality. Suppose that the correct interpretation
of quantum mechanics involves violations of the law of the excluded
middle. Does that show that (e.g.) it is no longer necessarily true
that it is either raining or not raining? Not at all. It only shows that
the scope of application of the law is less general than previously
thought. In those domains where the law does apply, however, it
18 Kit Fine, ‘Introduction’, Modality and Tense (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2005), 2.
19 Fine, op. cit. note 18, 1–2.
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applies necessarily. For to say that the law applies necessarily is to say
that it applies and could not have failed to apply, and the inapplicabil-
ity of the law in one domain entails neither its inapplicability nor the
possibility of its inapplicability in another domain (anymore than the
inapplicability of Einstenian physics at the quantum level entails its
inapplicability at the astronomical level). Parallel considerations
show that possibility is not the same as ‘being true somewhere’ (in
logical space) either. The modal status of modal truths has nothing
to do with how pervasive they are – temporally, spatially or across
possible worlds – but rather with the manner or mode in which
they are true – whenever and wherever they are true.
Admittedly, non-reductivemodal realism is slightly better off than it
reductive cousin over the issue of regularity. The non-reductive modal
realist takes worlds and their inhabitants to be primitively modal.
Accordingly, the fact that possibly p is not constituted by the fact that
p is true in some world simpliciter, but rather by the fact that p is true
in a world that is (primitively) possible. Possibility, then, is not merely
amatterof being true somewhere (in logical space). Still, non-reductive
modal realism is guilty of confusing necessity with universality. For
necessary facts are taken to be constituted by facts about what is true
in every (primitively) possible world.
A ﬁnal reason for thinking that non-reductive modal realism
cannot provide an adequate account of modality has been implicit
in what has been said so far: facts about possible worlds and their
inhabitants are strictly speaking irrelevant to ordinary modal
discourse. Possible worlds and their inhabitants are semantically irre-
levant – i.e., even if there are such entities, they are not what we are
talking about when we make ordinary modal claims. And possible
worlds and their inhabitants are metaphysically irrelevant – i.e.,
even if there are such entities, ordinary modal claims are not made
true by facts about them.
Kripke, of course, famously argued against counterpart theory on
the grounds of irrelevance. He wrote:
Thus ifwe say that ‘Humphreymighthavewon the election (if only
he had done such-and-such), we are not talking about something
that might have happened to Humphrey but to someone else, a
“counterpart”’. Probably, however, Humphrey could not care
less whether someone else, no matter how much resembling him,
would have been victorious in another possible world.20
20 Naming and Necessity, op. cit. note 2, 45 n13; see also Plantinga,
The Nature of Necessity, op. cit. note 2, 116ff.
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Kripke’s formulation of the objection from irrelevance unfortunately
confuses the object language, which contains modal expressions like
‘might have’, with the meta-language in which the counterpart-
theoretic truth-conditions for claims in the object-language are
given, which does not contain any modal expressions.21 The correct
analysis of ‘Humphrey might have won’ is thus not ‘A counterpart of
Humphrey might have won’ but rather ‘A counterpart of Humphrey
does win’. I also add that the issue of concern must be kept separate
from the issue of irrelevance, which is logically prior. Humphrey
does not care about the existence of a winning counterpart, because
of the irrelevance of such a counterpart to the truth that he might
havewon – not the otherwayaround. Concern is amatterof psychology;
irrelevance is a matter of semantics and metaphysics. All this said,
Kripke’s essential point is correct. On Lewis’ analysis, when we say
that Humphrey might have won we are in fact talking about
someone other than Humphrey.
Hazen and Divers resist this claim.22 According to them, we are
talking about Humphrey, for we are talking about a counterpart of
Humphrey. Reference to Humphrey (and to winning) is thus essential
to the correct assignment of counterpart-theoretic truth-conditions
for ‘Humphrey might have won’. But it is disingenuous to take this
sort of reference to Humphrey to show that, on the counterpart-
theoretic analysis, we are still talking about Humphrey. We plainly
are not. We are making a claim about another individual, one who
resembles Humphrey. Humphrey is, of course, relevant (indeed
essential) to the selection of the individual in question. But that
does not make the resulting claim one about Humphrey – anymore
than the claim that Humphrey’s favourite animal is threatened with
extinction is a claim about Humphrey, on the grounds that reference
to Humphrey is relevant (indeed essential) to the selection of the
animal in question.
As Divers points out, the core of the objection from irrelevance is
that counterpart theory wrongly construes possibilities (and necessi-
ties) as relational in nature.
Even when an intuitively non-relational feature is attributed as a
possibility, at aworld, to an individual – say their being in pain –
some other individual, and a relation get in on the (f)act: there is a
counterpart who is in pain. It is the very idea that all de re
21 Allen Hazen, ‘Counterpart Theoretic Semantics for Modal Logic’,
Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), 321.
22 Hazen, op. cit., note 21, 321–2, and Divers, Possible Worlds, op. cit.,
note 13, 129.
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possibility is misconstrued as having gratuitous relational struc-
ture – that an n-adic property is misconstrued as an (n þ 1)-adic
relation – that is ultimately the most plausible target for the irre-
levance objection.23
When I say thatHumphreymight havewon I takemyself to be stating
a non-relational fact about Humphrey. That is, I take myself to be
stating a fact involvingHumphrey and no other person – ormore care-
fully, a fact involving no other person who wins.24 But on Lewis’
analysis, that fact wrongly comes out as a relational one, namely, as
the fact that Humphrey stands in a certain similarity relation to
someone who exists in another possible world and wins there.
Are we mistaken in thinking that our intuitions concerning which
facts we state when we make (true) modal claims enjoy any special
authority? According to Hazen, counterpart theory must respect
our intuitions concerning the truth-values of ordinary modal
claims. But, he goes on to say, our ordinary modal intuitions have
no jurisdiction over the correctness or otherwise of the counterpart-
theoretic assignment of truth-conditions to those ordinary modal
claims. For those assignments are theoretical claims and our ordinary
intuitions have no jurisdiction over them.25 But this is wrong. As
Plantinga observes, there is no such ‘facile bifurcation’ between lin-
guistic intuition and theory.26 In assigning truth-conditions to ordin-
ary modal claims, counterpart theory (supposedly) determines the
actual content of those claims. But our intuitions concerning the cor-
rectness or otherwise of those content-ascriptions are relevant here.
For radical semantic externalism aside, we surely have some grip on
what our utterances mean. While we can all agree that there is
much about de re modality that we do not know, we certainly know
this much: when we say that Humphrey might have won we are not
talking about the electoral success of an individual who, while
closely resembling Humphrey, is nevertheless numerically distinct
from Humphrey, and indeed lives in a world that is both causally
and spatiotemporally sealed off from him. Can any amount of
theory convince us that that is what, say, Humphrey’s wife in fact
23 Possible Worlds, op. cit. note 13, 131.
24 Of course, the fact that Humphrey might have won entails the fact
that Nixon might have lost, but this does not make either fact relational in
nature.
25 Op. cit. note 21, 323–4.
26 Plantinga, ‘Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal
Reductionism’, reprinted in his Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality
(Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2003), 221; cf. Lewis, op. cit. note 1, 241.
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said to her husband on the morning after electoral defeat when
she uttered the words ‘Humphrey, dear, you might have won
the election’?
Divers complains that those who put forward the objection from
irrelevance often do not say ‘what application of [counterpart
theory] the irrelevance objection is supposed to undermine. Is it
that [counterpart theory] is supposed to be revealed as a failed
attempt at conceptual analysis, a failed account of truthmaking or
ontological identiﬁcation . . . .?’27 In my defence of it, the charge of
irrelevance is intended to be both semantic and metaphysical.
Counterpart theory assigns the wrong truth-conditions to ordinary
de re modal claims. Insofar as truth-conditions determine content,
counterpart theory gives us the wrong semantic analysis of ordinary
de re modal claims. And insofar as those truth-conditions specify
the features or parts of reality in virtue of which true de re modal
claims are true, counterpart theory gives us the wrong account of
the metaphysics of ordinary de re modality.
3. Ersatzism and Primitive Modality
In the preceding section, I argued that a non-reductive version of
modal realism cannot provide an adequate account of modality, for
such a version would still confront major difﬁculties that beset
Lewis’ own reductive brand of modal realism. It might be wondered
why so much time was spent arguing these points, given that non-
reductive modal realism is not a serious contender among theories
of modality. The answer is that some of the same difﬁculties that
beset reductive and non-reductive modal realism also beset what is
probably themost popular non-reductive approach tomodality: ersatz-
ism. Ersatzists includeKripke,who construes possibleworlds as ‘coun-
terfactual situations’, Plantinga, from whom possible worlds are
maximal possible states of affairs, Stalnaker, who takes them to be sui
generis properties, namely, ways things might have been, and Adams,
for whom they are sets of maximal consistent propositions.28 In what
follows, I will mostly ignore the speciﬁc differences that hold among
these (and other) versions of ersatzism, since the difﬁculties I shall
dwell upon hold independently of them.
Ersatzists do not make any claims to offer a reductive account of
modal notions, and indeed quite openly construe possible worlds as
27 Possible Worlds, op. cit. note 13, 132.
28 See note 2 above for references.
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primitively modal in nature – i.e., they construe possible worlds as
possible as opposed to impossible, and treat the possible/impossible
distinction as basic.29 According to the ersatzist, possible worlds
actually exist, and they are abstract objects of one sort or another.
Each of these objects represents the actual world as being some way
or other; we can therefore speak of what is the case according to
them. Ersatz possible worlds are indeed representatives of what they
represent, that is, they take the place of, do duty for, that which
they represent (hence the word ‘Ersatz’).30
Proponents of ersatzism provide the following analyses of modal
notions:
ðPDÞ Possibly P iff for some possible world w; P is true in w
ðNDÞ Necessarily P iff for every possible world w; P is true in w
ðPRÞ x is possibly F iff for some possible world w; x is F in w
ðNRÞ x is necessarily F iff for every possible world w; if x
exists in w; then x is F in w
These analyses differ from those proposed by the modal realist, ﬁrst,
in the way the ersatzist understands the notion of a possible world,
and secondly, in that the ersatzist allows individuals to exist in
more than one world. But this said, the ersatzist also takes modal
facts concerning the actual world and its inhabitants to be constituted
by (modal) facts concerning other possible worlds and their inhabi-
tants. Ersatzism thus invites the same charge of confusing the order
of explanation that was earlier levelled against modal realism.
29 Forrest’s conception of possible worlds as structural universals might
be an exception; see Peter Forrest, ‘Ways Worlds Could Be’, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, 64 (1986), 15–24. For discussion, see Forbes,
Languages of Possibility, op. cit. note 4, 80–2.
30 To clear up a potential elementary confusion: for the ersatzist all
possible worlds actually exist, but only one of them is actual. For a world
to be actual (non-actual) is for it to represent (fail to represent) things the
way they are. Some ersatzists, such as Plantinga, take the actual world
to be the same kind of entity as the merely possible ones, viz., an abstract
entity. (Plantinga thus distinguishes between the actual world and
physical reality – i.e., ‘us and our surroundings’). Other ersatzists
take the actual world and merely possible worlds to be different kinds of
entity – Stalnaker, for example, takes a merely possible world to be a prop-
erty, but takes the actual world to be the entity that instantiates one such
property.
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According to the ersatzist, Socrates is necessarily human in virtue of
the fact that he is human in every possible world in which he exists.
But that gets things the wrong way around. Socrates is human in
every possible world because he cannot exist without being human,
and so, in any possible world in which he exists, he is human. To
maintain otherwise is to make Socrates’ essential humanity depen-
dent on the circumstances in which he ﬁnds himself in – in
particular, his ﬁnding himself to be human in every world in which
he exists. And this implausibly makes the fact that every counterpart
of Socrates is human a metaphysical accident. To repeat, then,
the fact that Socrates is human in every world in which he
exists follows from the fact that he is necessarily human; it is not
constitutive of it.31
As a corollary, ersatzism is also guilty of confusing necessity with
universality, and hence with a kind of regularity. For, as the analyses
above make clear, the modal status of a necessary truth amounts to its
holding true in every possible world. But, again, to say that a necess-
ary truth is one that holds true in every possible world is in principle
no more plausible than to say that a necessary truth is one that holds
true everywhere within the actual world. The modal status of a
necessary truth concerns itsmode of being true, and that is not a func-
tion of how pervasive or universal the truth is.
Ersatzism also faces a version of the charge of irrelevance earlier
levelled against modal realism. Unlike the modal realist, of course,
the ersatzist believes that individuals can exist in more than one
world – they are ‘trans-world individuals’. Thus, what is possible
or necessary for an individual is analysed in terms of what is the
31 The sense that the ersatzist confuses the order of explanation is par-
ticularly acute in Adams’ version of ersatzism, according to which possible
worlds are sets of maximal consistent propositions (‘Theories of
Actuality’, op. cit. note 2). On Adams’ view, ‘For me to feel a pain in
some possible world is just for a proposition, to the effect that I feel pain,
to be a member of a certain kind of set of propositions (namely, of some
world-story)’ (‘Theories of Actuality’, 205). It follows from this that I am
possibly in pain just in case the proposition that I am in pain is a member
of a certain kind of set (a world-story). But I am not possibly in pain
in virtue of the fact that the proposition ‘I am in pain’ is a member of
some world-story, anymore than I am in pain in virtue of the fact that
‘I am in pain’ belongs to the set of actually true propositions. Rather: the
proposition ‘I am in pain’ belongs to the set of actually true propositions
in virtue of the fact that I am indeed in pain. And similarly, the proposition
‘I am in pain’ is a member of someworld-story in virtue of the fact that I am
indeed possibly in pain.
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case for that very same individual in some or all of the possible worlds
in which it exists. For example, Socrates is necessarily human in
virtue of the fact that Socrates – our Socrates (the only Socrates!) –
is human in every possible world in which he exists. Where, then,
is the irrelevance in the ersatzist’s analysis?
To see where, let us begin by noting that, for the ersatzist, a poss-
ible world is not really a world. A possible world is not a place,
and individuals do not exist in a world in the literal sense of being
parts of it.32 For the ersatzist, it will be recalled, a possible world
is an abstract object. It represents the actual world as being a certain
way, a way which includes having certain individuals, such as
Humphrey, for whom things go differently than in the actual world,
e.g., Humphrey wins the 1968 election. But the question is why
should facts about (such) representations tell us anything about the
things represented? Why should the existence of a representation of a
winning Humphrey tell us anything about what is genuinely possible
for Humphrey? In short, then, what is the relevance of such represen-
tations, which are themselves abstract objects, for what is genuinely
possible for Humphrey, himself a concrete object?
Here, of course, we must distinguish between what is true of a
possible world and what is true according to it.33 What is true of a
possible world is that it is an abstract object, that is has the capacity
to represent things, etc. The ersatzist will agree that such truths
are irrelevant to questions about what is possible or necessary for
the actual world and its inhabitants. But the ersatzist maintains
nevertheless that what is true according to a possible world is relevant
to such modal matters. For he thinks that, say, the possibility of
Humphrey’s winning the election is constituted by the fact that
there is a possible world according to which Humphrey wins the
election.
But even when we distinguish between what is true of a possible
world and what is true according to it, the charge of irrelevance
remains. For the bottom line is that, according to the ersatzist,
32 An object x exists in a world w only in the following sense: if w had
been actual, x would have existed simpliciter (Plantinga, The Nature of
Necessity, op. cit. note 2, 46ff; cf. Stalnaker, ‘Modalities and Possible
Worlds’, op. cit. note 15, 336).
33 Oderberg appears not to distinguish between the two when he makes
a similar complaint to mine: ‘. . . the question arises as to how what is true of
that kind of thing [a possible world construed as an abstract object] can have
any bearing on the modal properties of a concrete material object such as a
man, a mouse or a mountain’ (Real Essentialism, op. cit. note 16, 3; emphasis
added).
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possibilities and necessities are constituted by the existence of abstract
objects which represent the realisation of those possibilities and
necessities. But the existence of, say, a possible world which rep-
resents Humphrey as winning the election is no more constitutive
of the possibility of his winning than is the existence of a consistent
novel or ﬁlm which represents him as winning. To insist otherwise
is ultimately to confuse a representation with what it represents.
Possible worlds can represent necessities and possibilities, but they
are not identical with those necessities and possibilities themselves.
The point is so basic that it should hardly need making – no one,
after all, would confuse a portrait with its subject, etc. And yet
philosophers enchanted by possible worlds are happy to conﬂate
representations with the things they represent when it comes to
modality.34
The charge against the ersatzist is not merely that he identiﬁes facts
of one sort with facts of a different sort.That, after all, is a very common
phenomenon in philosophy. To give one obvious example, somemate-
rialists in the philosophy of mind identify mental facts with physical
facts about brains. This identiﬁcation is implausible in my view,
but let us suppose it were correct. Then the right analogy with ersatz-
ism would be this: identifying the fact that (e.g.) Humphrey might
have won the election with the fact that there is an abstract object
that represents Humphrey as winning (or, for that matter, with the
fact that there is a counterpart of Humphrey who wins the election
in another world) is like identifying the mental facts associated with
one person (i.e., the facts about that person’s mental life) with phys-
ical facts about a representation of his brain (or with physical facts
about the brain of someone who is mentally very much like him).
If mental facts are identical with physical facts at all, then the
mental facts associated with a given person must surely be identical
with physical facts about that person’s brain. Similarly, if modal
facts are identical with facts about possible worlds and their inhabi-
tants at all, then the fact that Humphrey might have won must be
identical with the fact that Humphrey himself wins in another
possible world – not with the fact that there exists an abstract
object which represents Humphrey as winning (nor with the fact
that there is a counterpart of Humphrey whowins in another possible
34 Indeed, not just when it comes to modality. Witness, for example,
Lewis’ and Stalnaker’s identiﬁcation of propositions with sets of possible
worlds where they hold true. This is patently inadequate: propositions
can be true or false; sets can be neither (cf. Plantinga, ‘Two Concepts of
Modality’, op. cit. note 26, 207).
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world).35 The charge of irrelevance, then, is directed at the identiﬁ-
cation ofmodal facts with facts of thewrong sort, and not at the identi-
ﬁcation of modal facts with facts of a merely different sort.
Lewis, and various writers after himmake the point that if Kripke’s
charge of irrelevance applies to the modal realist’s analyses of de re
modality, then it also applies to the ersatzist’s analyses of de remodality.
Writing about the related issue of concern and care, for example,Melia
says that such considerations ‘would also refute the view that possible
worlds are abstract entities, since Humphrey is not presumably inter-
ested in whether or not there is an abstract entity according to which
he wins’.36 Melia, of course, intends this remark to count in favour of
Lewis’ modal realism, for if ersatzism is no better off when it comes
to the charge of irrelevance, then that is not a stick with which it can
beat modal realism. This is dialectically correct. But unlike Melia
et al., the conclusion I draw is that both modal realism and ersatzism
should be rejected. Regardless of whether we construe possible
worlds as actually existing or asmerely possible, as abstract or concrete,
as primitively modal or non-modal in nature, facts about what goes on
in them are simply irrelevant to the content and truth of the ordinary
modal claims we make about the actual word and its inhabitants. The
possible-worlds framework, therefore, cannot serve as an adequate
basis for an account of modality.37
35 I do not mean to imply, of course, that it is indeed correct to identify
the fact that Humphrey might have won with the fact that Humphrey
himself wins in another possible world (anymore than it is correct to identify
mental facts with physical facts). In order for Humphrey himself to win in
another possible world, that world would have to be concrete, since
Humphrey is concrete and he would be literally a part of it. But as
I argued in section 2, there are no concrete possible worlds. And even if
there were, Humphrey could not exist in two of them (as the present identi-
ﬁcation would require), for no concrete object can be in two different places
at the same time.
36 Modality, op. cit. note 4, 108; cf. Lewis, op. cit. note 1, 196 and
Divers, Possible Worlds, op. cit. note 13, 129, 134–5.
37 Rosen’s ﬁctionalism about worlds, which is itself a form of anti-
realism rather than realism about possible worlds, is also susceptible to
the objection from irrelevance (Rosen himself observes this; see his
‘Modal Fictionalism’,Mind, 99 (1990), 349–54). According to ﬁctionalism,
facts about what is possible and necessary are identical with facts about the
content of the story PW – the hypothesis of a plurality of concrete worlds.
Thus, the fact thatHumphreymight havewon is (supposedly) identical with
the fact that according to PW, there is a world in which a counterpart of
Humphrey wins. Rosen candidly brings out the implausibility of this identi-
ﬁcation by noting that it calls for a radical shift in our patterns of modal
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4. Two Legitimate Uses of Possible Worlds
Despitewhat has been argued so far, I do notwish to deny that possible
worlds can be useful. I conclude this paper by considering two such
uses.38 First, possible worlds can be rhetorically useful: they can
provide a vivid and colourful way of expressing modal claims. This
use of possible worlds is deeply entrenched in contemporary metaphy-
sics; somuch so, indeed, that even philosopherswhowouldbaulk at the
suggestion that there are possible worlds are happy to use the idiom
themselves.39
The rhetorical use of possible worlds is perhaps comparable to the
rhetorical use of God-talk. Both uses are nicely illustrated by a pair of
informal characterisations of the idea that the mental supervenes on
the physical:
[1] Ask what Oskar’s mental life would be in a counterfactual
situation or possible world which duplicated all physical
aspects of Oskar’s actual state. Supervenience maintains
agreement in all mental aspects also.
[2] Imagine the gods constructing the world from scratch. They
pick the individuals and set all their physical properties.
According to supervenience the Gods have thereby also set
the individuals’ mental properties.40
interest and concern. Thus, if ﬁctionalism is correct, Humphrey must now
care deeply about what happens to a certain ﬁctional character (his winning
counterpart) in the story PW. This is implausible. I also note that, as
observed earlier, the issue of concern presupposes the issue of irrelevance.
Humphrey cannot be expected to care deeply about the fate of a certain ﬁc-
tional character because facts about that character are simply irrelevant to
what is true of Humphrey, namely, that he might have won. The ﬁctional
character, and the world he inhabits, represent Humphrey as winning,
and are therefore at best evidence that Humphrey might indeed have won.
(For a general overview of ﬁctionalism, see Nolan, ‘Modal Fictionalism’,
Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Zalta (ed.), (http://plato.stanfor-
d.edu/entries/ﬁctionalism-modal/).)
38 I will not consider the issue of whether possible worlds (construed as
abstract objects) can be useful in philosophical accounts of concepts other
than modality, though I have already indicated that one such additional
use (propositions) is problematic (see footnote 15 above).
39 Whether this lack of ‘ontological seriousness’ is harmless is an
important question, but one which I leave for another occasion.
40 Paul Teller, ‘Supervenience’, in Kim and Sosa (eds.), op. cit. note
15, 485.
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Possible worlds and God afford vivid ways of illustrating the superve-
nience claim, which is itself an ordinary modal claim – namely, the
claim that there can be no difference in the mental without a difference
in the physical. But possible worlds are no more essential to determin-
ing the content of supervenience (and other ordinary modal) claims
than God is. If putting ordinary modal claims in the idiom of possible
worlds is helpful, that is only because they bring out a consequence of
those claims. Thus, if the mental supervenes on the physical, then it
follows that no two worlds that are physically alike can differ in the
mental facts that obtain in them – a claim that is true even if there
are no possible worlds. Drawing out this particular consequence can
be useful in the way in which, quite generally, the content of a claim
can be clariﬁed by considering its consequences.
A second, more substantial use of possible worlds is in the area of
modal logic.41 In the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, a number of logi-
cians, notably C.I Lewis, developed systems of modal logic, the
aim of which was to formalize modal inference. These various
systems were non-equivalent; they differed mostly by including or
excluding controversial axioms about iterated modalities, such as
‘If p, then necessarily possibly p’, ‘if necessarily p, then necessarily
necessarily p’, and so on. While it was possible to investigate the
logical relations among the resulting systems, it was not clear which
were correct, or what the differences between them amounted to
exactly. These matters could not be settled simply by invoking
modal intuitions, since there was no widespread consensus on them
either. Furthermore, for some formulae there were no intuitions at
all, e.g., ‘if possibly necessarily p, then necessarily possibly possibly
necessarily p’. As Loux points out, the problem with such a
formula is not merely that we have no settled intuitions about it; it
is that we have no idea what it means.42 Indeed, systems of modal
logic had a syntax but no semantics, i.e., they did not specify
models for those systems, sets of objects in terms of which the
logical formulae could be interpreted.
In the late 1950s and early 60s the situation changed.43 A number of
logicians, including Kripke, used the framework of possible worlds to
41 For an accessible account of this use of possible worlds, see Michael
Loux, ‘Introduction: Modality and Metaphysics’, in Loux (ed.), op. cit.
note 2, 16–30.
42 Loux, op. cit. note 41, 19.
43 Although Carnap had already done some pioneering work in his
Meaning and Necessity, ﬁrst published in 1947 (Chicago: Chicago
University Press).
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provide systems ofmodal logic with a formal semantics.44Kripke’s pro-
posed semantics for a propositional modal logic consists of an ordered
triple fG, K, Rg, whereK is a set of objects, G is one of those objects,
and R is a relation deﬁned over the members of K. Intuitively, said
Kripke, we can think of K as the set of all possible worlds, G as the
actual world, and R as a relation of ‘accessibility’ (or ‘relative possi-
bility’) between possible worlds – a world w is accessible relative to a
world w1 just in case every true proposition in w is possibly true in w1.
For a system of quantiﬁed modal logic, we add a function assigning a
set of objects to each member of K – intuitively, we think of that set
as the set of objects existing at a given possible world.With this seman-
tics, the differences among controversial axioms of iterated modality,
and hence the differences among the various systems of modal logic
they give rise to, can be understood as arising out of the placing of
different restrictions on the accessibility relations holding among
worlds. Thus, the question of whether, say, what is actual is necessarily
possible can now be understood as the more manageable question of
whether the accessibility relation is symmetric. The possible-world
semantics also made it possible to deﬁne the key logical notion of
validity and with it to give completeness proofs for different systems
of modal logic.
This is all well and good. The trouble begins only when the frame-
work of possible worlds is taken to provide not only a formal seman-
tics for modal logic, but also an applied semantics for ordinary modal
discourse.45 Modal logic is an artiﬁcial language; we are at liberty to
stipulate meaning for it in pretty much whatever way we like. Indeed,
as Lewis observes, a Kripke-style semantics for (e.g.) propositional
modal logic need not in fact make use of the framework of possible
worlds; all it needs is some set of objects or other, and a binary
relation deﬁned over them.46 On the other hand, ordinary modal dis-
course is evidently embedded in a natural language. As such, it
already has a semantics. The job of the philosopher is to understand
44 Saul Kripke, ‘Semantical Considerations onModal Logic’, reprinted
in Leonard Linsky (ed.), Reference and Modality (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1971), 63–87.
45 Here a remark byKripke is apposite: ‘The apparatus of possiblewords
(sic) has (I hope) been very useful as far as the set-theoretic model-theory of
quantiﬁed modal logic is concerned, but has encouraged philosophical
pseudo-problems and misleading pictures’ (Naming and Necessity, op. cit.
note 2, 48 n15).
46 Lewis, op. cit. note 1, 18ff.
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it – not to stipulate it. That semantics, I have urged, is not adequately
given by the framework of possible worlds.47
Lewis, of course, (in)famously motivated the commitment to poss-
ible worlds partly by saying that ‘possible world’ is just another name
for ‘ways things might have been’, and we ordinarily (and correctly)
believe that there are countless ways things might have been (the
so-called ‘paraphrase argument for possible worlds’48). The ersatzist
agrees.49 However, it is one thing to say that the belief in possible
worlds is implicit in what we ordinarily believe, and quite another
to say that our ordinary modal beliefs (e.g., ‘It could have been
sunny today’) are beliefs about possible worlds and their inhabitants.
Furthermore, it is disingenuous to claim that the belief in possible
worlds is indeed implicit in what we ordinarily believe. In Lewis’
mouth, ‘possible world’ is (also) a name for ‘causally and spatiotem-
porally disconnected concrete world’ – and we do not ordinarily
believe in that. The ersatzist might claim an advantage here, since he
does not construe possible worlds as concrete objects. But the advan-
tage is illusory, for he construes possible worlds as abstract objects
that represent the different ways things might have been – objects
which are also causally and spatiotemporally isolated from us – and
wedo not ordinarily believe in them either. BothLewis and the ersatzist
turn our ordinary belief that there are countless ways thingsmight have
been into a belief in the existence of objects of one sort or another. In
doing so, they turn an ordinary belief into one that is anything but
ordinary. To then claim support for the non-ordinary belief by appeal-
ing to the ordinary one is disingenuous at best.
University of Zu¨rich
47 To deny that the possible-worlds semantics is the right semantics for
our ordinary modal discourse is not to deny, of course, that ordinary modal
claims can be about worlds. If I say that the world could have been a better
place, for example, I am evidently making a claim about the actual world.
But according to the possible-worlds semantics, I am in fact making a
claim about a different world – one which exists, but is not actual – for
what I am saying is that there is a possible world which is indeed a better
place than the actual world. It is this sort of analysis that I am rejecting.
48 See Lewis, op. cit. note 8, 84.
49 Cf. van Inwagen, ‘Two Concepts of Possible Worlds’, reprinted in
his Ontology, Identity and Modality (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001), 208; Loux, op. cit. note 41, 30ff. Stalnaker is an exception;
see his ‘Possible Worlds’, op. cit. note 2, 226–227.
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